From independence through 2004, the sixteen West African states have experienced forty-four successful military-led coups, forty-three often-bloody failed coups, at least eighty-two coup plots, seven civil wars, and many other forms of political conflict. Part I of this article used a political-economy approach to provide theoretical explanations of this record. Part II presents a unique data set describing all coup-related events in West Africa since 1955. Military interventions are widespread, occurring repeatedly in fourteen states. These data permit examination of coup behavior over the past fifty years. No evidence of declining coup activity is found. The major instances of war and conflict are reported, and it is shown that coups and conflict are reciprocally related. Changes that might reduce coups and conflict and permit these countries and their 238 million citizens to have better lives are discussed in the conclusion.
that West African poverty and instability pose a security threat to Europe and the United States as well as a costly and difficult burden for the international community as a whole. 2 For these reasons, the study of coups and conflict in West Africa has practical as well as theoretical importance.
It was argued in part I that a political-economy perspective using world-system theory and rational-choice theory could explain why West African states are so peripheral, poor, and structurally weak and why so many rulers have engaged in predation rather than in political and economic development. The result of these patterns has been underdevelopment and profound state weakness, the major structural causes of coups and violent conflict in the region. The focus of this part is on the evidence of West African coups and conflict since 1955 in the case of Liberia or since independence for the other fifteen states.
Military Coups d'Etat
African political competition is a self-perpetuating, zero-sum game.
-Arthur A. Goldsmith 3 Political instability and conflict can take many forms, ranging from what Donald G. Morrison and associates have called "turmoil," which involves such events as riots, demonstrations, and strikes, to "interstate conflict" such as liberation and interstate wars. 4 This article deals with many, but not all, of the more serious types of conflict and instability in postcolonial West Africa: "mass instability" involving revolts and rebellions; "communal instability" involving civil wars, rebellions, and irredentism; "elite instability" or coups d'etat; and "interstate conflict and instability" comprising illegal trade (usually arms and diamonds), border incidents, armed interventions, liberation wars, and interstate wars. While they are important events in West African politics, ethnic violence and vigilantism are not included here due to considerations of both space and focus. Rather, our prime focus is on the dramatic, newsworthy, and distinct events of coups and on the three types of war-civil, liberation, and interstate (see Table 3 below). Table 1 summarizes our data on military coup events in West Africa from January 1955 to the end of 2004. Mwakikagile provides narrative descriptions of successful coups and some of the more spectacular failed coups between 1960 and 1999, except for Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritania, and Senegal. 5 Complete descriptions of all 169 events in the fifteen West African states that have seen military interventions of some type are available in our event data file. tion of longtime opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade in 2000 and the free and fair legislative elections in April 2001, Senegal has joined Cape Verde as one of the region's most stable democracies. 7 However, human rights violations in its Casamance region were a problem during the twenty-two-year insurgency that only ended in late December 2004.
Coup Frequencies
The situation is much more problematic among the other fourteen states of West Africa. Since independence, or January 1955 in the case of Liberia, they have experienced eighty-six coups, of which forty-four were successful, defined as the coup makers' holding power for at least one week. 8 Sierra Leone leads the pack with twelve attempts, of which five were successful. The least amount of coup activity has been in Mali, where two coup attempts in 1968 and 1991 were both successful. Indeed, Ghana, with five successful coups among a total of eleven attempts, as well as numer- One reason West Africa has experienced so many coups is that once undertaken, they have a good chance of succeeding. This fact has been well noted by the military throughout the region! The overall success rate is 50.6 percent, although this varies from a high of 100 percent in Mali and 86 percent in Burkina Faso to only 25 percent in Togo, Liberia, Guinea, and Côte d'Ivoire. Even in weak and poor West African states, the symbolic and material benefits for those who control the state are such that attempting a coup has become a risky but nevertheless rational political strategy for khaki-clad rent seekers.
One striking example of rent extraction by the military is found in tiny and poor Gambia, where the possibilities of enrichment from political office have been miniscule in comparison with countries like Ghana and Nigeria, although this may change with the reported discovery of offshore petroleum. 10 On July 22, 1994, thentwenty-nine-year-old Lt. Yaya Jammeh led a bloodless coup that overthrew the longtime, quasi-democratic rule of President Dawda Jawara.
11 Now in power for ten years, winning presidential "elections" in 1996 and 2001 and thereby creating one of West Africa's "electoral autocracies," Jammeh is said to be one of the richest Gambians and is "included among the richest heads of state in West Africa." 12 His wealth does not come from his official presidential salary that is less than $19,000 a year. Rather, Jammeh and his cronies own the Mall of Gambia and other valuable real estate at home and abroad, they control the parallel market for foreign exchange, they skim foreign aid and Nigerian crude-oil imports, and they run a travel business for Gambian pilgrims to Mecca. Through the Jammeh Foundation, he shares part of his wealth and has modernized his native village of Kaninlai, much to the delight of its inhabitants. Because some of his off-the-books income trickles down to ordinary Gambians, many regard Jammeh as a "Mansa," or king, who jokes that his money comes from "Allah's Bank." Meanwhile, his wife receives her medical attention in Europe while most Gambians lack proper health care of any kind.
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The 1960s were once called "the military decade in Africa." 14 In West Africa, Togo (two), Benin (five), Burkina Faso (one), Nigeria (two), Ghana (one), Sierra Leone (two), and Mali (one) all experienced one or more successful coups between 1963 and 1969. This set a ball rolling that has yet to stop. Most recently, during the eleven years between 1994 and 2004, Gambia (two), Guinea (one), Guinea-Bissau (two), Côte d'Ivoire (four), Liberia (one), Mauritania (one), Niger (two), and Sierra Leone (five) have all suffered attempted coups, which were successful in the cases of Gambia (one), Guinea-Bissau (one), Côte d'Ivoire (one), Niger (two), and Sierra Leone (two). The use of force to seize state power for personal and group enrichment remains a common feature of politics in West Africa.
A final feature of Table 1 is worth discussion. Despite their violent political histories, it is now two decades since a coup was attempted in Ghana and more than a decade in the cases of Benin, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Togo, and Mali. Since their last attempts, constitutional reforms and political liberalization have moved Benin, Ghana, and Mali in the direction of multiparty political democracy, while Burkina Faso and Nigeria have made less successful efforts in this direction as their elections may be free but are seldom fair. 15 Democratic civilian control of the military in West Africa, as in the rest of the world, seems the best means of keeping armies in their barracks. But it is no guarantee among weak states, particularly when democratic politics is marred by pervasive corruption (e.g., the Gambia and Nigeria) and the politicization of ethnicity (e.g., Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria).
Since the first successful coup in Togo in 1963, the West African pattern confirms Zolberg's early generalization that coups in Africa can happen anywhere at anytime. 16 But once a West African military has "lost its virginity" and seized power, it has generally been the case that more plots and attempts soon follow. 17 Never having experienced a successful coup, Cape Verde and Senegal support this generalization, as do all the other fourteen more-coup-prone states. Reading the descriptions of all the plots, attempts, and coups in West Africa in our data file points to a key variable: If the initial successful coup leads to factionalism in the military and associated security services, more plots and coups will follow, and the situation may deteriorate into pervasive communal instability or civil war. And, in West Africa, coups have generally resulted in military factionalism because, as Decalo once explained, "many African armies bear little resemblance to a modern complex organizational model and are instead a coterie of armed camps owing primary clientelist allegiance to a handful of mutually competitive officers of different ranks seething with a variety of corporate, ethnic and personal grievances." 18 The bases of military factionalism in West African militaries are as varied as the region's states and peoples, but several stand out. Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria have experienced military factionalism along ethnic, religious, and regional backgrounds and identities. Rivalries within the army based on rank-senior officers versus junior officers versus noncommissioned officers-have been another source of factionalism, as in Liberia beginning with Sergeant Samuel Doe's 1980 coup. A third source of factionalism has been rivalry and jealousy between regular army officers and men and those in specially favored "elite" units such as presidential guards or gendarmeries. Finally, when factionalism becomes extreme, personal rivalries among members of a ruling junta and their separate groups of army supporters have led to coups as in Burkina Faso, when Blaise Compaoré murdered his "comrade," the charismatic Thomas Sankara, in 1987. Figure 1 reports the five-year frequency of coup behavior in West Africa. In contrast to the rest of the world, where "coups became less common and less effective from the 1970s onward," 19 West Africa remains the most coup-prone region in the world, reinforcing the relevance of this study. The only coup-free five years were 1955 through 1959 when only Liberia, Ghana, and Guinea were independent. Nigeria and all the other francophone states in the region became independent in 1960; military interventions began soon thereafter, and they have continued to this day. Beginning with 1960 to 1965, every five-year period has seen a mix of failed and successful coup Two apparent trends are evident in Figure 1 . First, coup activity tended to increase from the early 1960s until 1980 to 1984, and since then, it has declined but in no way ended. A second parallel trend since 1985 is the decline in the likelihood of success when a coup is launched. However, on closer examination, the picture is somewhat more complex.
Coup Trends
The first row of Table 2 reproduces the five-year frequencies of all coup attempts from Figure 1 . This permits calculating the second row's success rate, which is simply the number of successful coups in each period divided by all coup attempts in the same period. From 1980 to 1984, the success rate was at or well above the overall average of 51 percent. Beginning in 1985 to 1989, the rate has been well below the average except for 1995 to 1999. We can speculate that political leaders have learned some important lessons from their regional, national, and personal histories. In West Africa, it is both rational and prudent to expect a coup attempt anywhere and at any time. Rulers may have learned to prepare themselves better than their predecessors did to prevent coups from becoming successful by, for example, improving intelligence, sharing intelligence with other governments, and "taking cues from what is happening to other leaders in neighboring countries" because coups can be contagious and affect politics throughout the region.
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The third row of Table 2 combines information from Table 2 in part I and from Table 1 1955-1959 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 21 The number of independent states in West Africa has changed over time from one in January 1955 (Liberia) to sixteen by July 1975 when Cape Verde finally achieved its independence from Portugal. Thus, the increase in coup attempts from 1960 to 1984 apparent in Figure 1 may be nothing more than a consequence of the increasing opportunities to stage a coup as more and more West African states became independent.
This problem can be eliminated by calculating the fourth row of Table 2 , called "country years. Several relatively recent changes in West Africa's political environment may be affecting the likelihood that a coup will be attempted. One is the democratization trend that began in Benin in 1989. As Goldsmith notes, one of classical liberalism's justifications for regularly scheduled democratic elections is that they are a means for recruiting new leadership talent in a low-risk, predictable fashion sharply in contrast to coups and civil wars. This pan-African initiative may have discouraged some West African militaries from plotting and attempting coups. However, the claim that "the days of the coup in Africa are numbered and while the response may be a little slow and a little ad hoc, the AU will do what it can by any means necessary to ensure that regime changes take the form of legitimate expressions of the will of the people" seems premature at this juncture because the AU does not have the capacity to compel democratic behavior as shown by the successful coup in Mauritania on August 3, 2005 . 26 This said, if foreign-aid-donor nations would cooperate with the AU and withhold aid from any country that experiences a coup, "together, they could help make African coups a scourge of the past." 27 Thus, the changes in success rates, leadership transitions, and coup rates discussed in Table 2 may not be trends at all. Nothing fundamental has changed since the mid1980s in the region's international and local political economy and in the rational motivations of its leaders. If anything, the situation has gotten worse, making the control of political office and the use of violence to gain wealth and power even more strategically rational. In addition, factionalism within West African militaries remains widespread, as demonstrated by numerous, field-research-based case studies, and no military in the region has undergone fundamental reform since coups began in the 1960s. 28 Therefore, it is entirely possible that the first decade of the twenty-first century will see an upsurge in coup activity with an unpredictable host of specific and idiosyncratic factors determining failures and successes.
Coups and Conflict in West Africa
How can we hope to attract foreign investment, essential for creating the jobs that so many millions of West African youths desperately need, if some of our leaders continue to pursue the logic of war and vendetta year after year? -UN Special Representative for West Africa Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (November 2004) 29 Table 3 summarizes the record of major intra-and interstate conflicts in West Africa since 1955. Ageyman-Duah, Copson, Kacowicz, Reno, Herbst, Jackson, and Newbury present good analyses of this conflict record. 30 West Africa has yet to experience such severe interstate wars as those fought between Ethiopia, on one hand, and Somalia (1978) and Eritrea (1998), on the other hand (totaling at least 250,000 mainly combatant deaths). 31 Sudan's horrendous three-sided civil war in terms of its duration (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) ) and casualties (now more than 2.8 million) is worse than anything so far experienced in West Africa. 32 The recent conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that began in 1998, Africa's so-called First World War, is 1960-1963, 1965, 1982, 1986, 1994 Border incidents unprecedented due to the extent of intervention in the fighting by other African states and its 3.3 to 3.5 million mainly civilian casualties, making it the most deadly war since World War II. Nevertheless, as a region, West Africa has seen and continues to see more serious conflicts than elsewhere in SSA. In part, this is because the region fits so perfectly the findings of a major recent study of all civil wars between 1960 and 1999: the most important risk factors are poverty, low economic growth, and overdependence on natural resources such as oil or diamonds. 33 This makes sense as the production and export of agricultural and industrial products are normally widespread in a given country, whereas mineral production occurs at specific locations with known export routes that may be dominated by a given ethnic group or open to seizure by a rebel force such as the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. 34 Moreover, the nature of conflict in the region has changed overtime. Before the onset of the Liberian civil war in 1989, West African conflicts were of a "classical" type often derived from the region's illogical territorial map, one of the major negative legacies from the colonial era. Such conflicts include three brief interstate "wars" over the disputed border between Burkina Faso and Mali;
35 rebellions and irredentist movements by ethnic minorities in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger, and Togo; wars of national liberation in Guinea-Bissau against the Portuguese and in the Western Sahara against Mauritania and Morocco; and border incidents between Benin and Togo, Ghana and Togo, Mauritania and Morocco, and Nigeria and Cameroon.
The major conflict of these early years was the Nigerian civil war between the Nigerian Federal Republic and the Biafran secessionists. Nigeria received material support from the United Kingdom, the USSR, and Egypt, and Biafra received material support indirectly from France via Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon. But the fighting was between the Biafran army and the Nigerian Federal Armed Forces. Historically, many civil wars have been internationalized in this fashion, and in this sense, both the war itself and the subsequent reconciliation between the secessionists and the Gowon government were classical. Most important, the war did not destabilize neighboring states.
With the beginning of the Liberian civil war in 1989, a new pattern of serious conflict has developed in West Africa. Civil wars in Côte d'Ivoire, 36 Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have diffused conflict and refugees across the southwestern part of the region (the first Liberian civil war alone created some 600,000 international refugees out of a total population of 2.5 million). 37 Rebel forces ignore borders, arms and blood diamonds are smuggled and fuel conflict, mercenaries from South Africa and elsewhere are recruited, diasporas fund favored factions, human rights abuses of the most shocking nature proliferate, and civilian populations are targeted by what Charles Tilly has called "bottom-up terror." 38 War economies and warlords such as Liberia's Charles Taylor destroy their own countries and interfere in and destabilize their neighbors.
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Because of the extensive poverty, joblessness, and economic stagnation in the region from Nigeria to Senegal, "for at least a generation . . . an aging Kalashnikov has been a meal ticket. A gun has given tens of thousands of bored and hungry young men-and increasingly, young women-license to pillage homes, extort money, rape, kill and sow havoc across West Africa. They have been the foot soldiers in the conflicts that have plagued the region for the last 15 years," 40 and they will remain available for recruitment by the next local warlord or vigilante leader until opportunities for education, training, and legitimate employment are created to meet their aspirations.
Peacemaking and peacekeeping forces from Nigeria, the Economic Community of West African States, Britain, France, the United States (very briefly), and the United Nations have variously been drawn into these conflicts to protect lives and property, to end the fighting, and to enforce shaky peace agreements. These conflicts are so interrelated that the United Nations is reported to be considering asking the Security Council to authorize cross-border UN patrols and cross-border air support in an effort to contain what the United Nation's head of mission for Sierra Leone Daudi Ngelautwa Mwakawago has called these "cockroaches" of war. 41 In our globalized world, a zone of conflict of this size attracts criminal mafias and terrorist organizations and sends refugees across the African continent and elsewhere-7,000 Liberian refugees arrived in the United States, Norway, and Sweden in 2004. In several instances, coups have been caused by conflicts. Mauritania's first coup in July 1978 was caused by the army's unhappiness over the bloody, costly, and apparently open-ended war with the POLISARIO (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro) liberation movement in Western Sahara. The failure to end the long civil war against the Revolutionary United Front provoked a military coup in Sierra Leone in May 1997. While being distinct political phenomena, coups and civil wars in West Africa are mutually reinforcing: coups and military factionalism weaken states, weak states provoke rebellion, and civil wars often incite coup attempts. Both are major manifestations of the failure to achieve political order and institutionalization in the region. 43 The new AU rejects coups and military rule and wants to create a "rapid-reaction" force to stop wars from spiraling out of control. If the core of this AU force were to be made up of units from the Nigerian and South African armies, then the G-7 and United Nations should provide it major funding as a cost-effective means of achieving a more peaceful Africa by Africans.
Conclusion
Africa is today part of a single world-system, the capitalist world-system, and its present structures and processes cannot be understood unless they are situated within the social framework that is governing them.
-Immanuel Wallerstein
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In both parts of this article, it has been argued that West Africa's dire situation results from its deep peripherality within the capitalist world-system. As the periphery of the periphery, the region's states are poor, weak, and mainly autocratic. The region's class structures, which derive from its position in the world-system, are not conducive to the establishment of stable democracies. These structural features promote political instability and conflict that in turn, encourage selfish, predatory political leadership. Poor leadership further impoverishes the states of West Africa and keeps them locked in the periphery.
Yet, as noted in part I, there are exceptions to this weak-state/poor-leadership hypothesis in West Africa. Cape Verde and Senegal are long-standing democracies without a history of military coups and civil wars. 46 Despite their earlier histories of political instability, since the early 1990s, both Ghana and Mali have emerged as young democracies without a coup attempt since 1984 and 1991, respectively. 47 Also, neither has experienced a civil war or other forms of extensive mass political violence. What can account for these four states' variation from the otherwise dismal West African norm?
Given the peripherality of all sixteen West African states, one cannot argue that these four states are now more democratic and stable because they have ascended into the semiperiphery, like South Africa. Table 3 in part I did demonstrate, however, that Cape Verde and Ghana have achieved the highest levels of human development in West Africa, although improving socioeconomic circumstances cannot explain the cases of Senegal and Mali. Thus, structural factors will not get us very far in explaining variation within West Africa, although they are fundamental in explaining variation between West Africa and the rest of the world.
Thanks to Afrobarometer, we know that voting-age citizens in all four countries are opposed to military rule by large majorities ranging from 65 percent in Mali to 83 percent in Ghana, with Cape Verde and Senegal essentially tied at 75 percent and 76 percent, respectively. 48 In a large-scale comparative analysis such as this, all we can say is that in these four democracies, public opinion strongly opposes military rule. More study of variation in political attitudes and culture within West Africa is strongly suggested by our findings.
What clearly does make these four states different from the rest of West Africa is the quality of their political leadership since independence in the cases of Cape Verde and Senegal and since the coups that brought Jerry Rawlings and Amadou Touré to power in Ghana Rawlings and Touré came to power violently in coups but moved quickly (Touré) and more slowly (Rawlings) to institutionalize multiparty democracy in their respective countries. 49 In short, the leaders in all four of these West African democracies were willing to make long-term investments in political development rather than mainly seeking short-term personal gains for themselves and their associates.
This argument is supported by the negative example of the Côte d'Ivoire, ruled for just over thirty-three years by that master politician Felix Houphouet-Boigny . Other than two reported coup plots and two easily defeated, small-scale ethnic rebellions, Houphouet's Côte d'Ivoire was perhaps the most politically and economically successful state in West Africa until the global commodity-price downturn in the mid-1980s. This structural economic crisis-the Côte d'Ivoire is the world's largest cocoa producer-and Houphouet's death in 1993 resulted in a succession of weak, ethnically divisive, blatantly corrupt leaders; a successful coup in 1999; and further military factionalism resulting in more plots, two bloody failed coups, and a civil war that erupted in September 2002 and ignited again in November 2004. 50 These positive and negative examples suggest that the quality of political leadership in promoting or preventing coups and conflict in West Africa and elsewhere in the global periphery also deserves more-detailed study.
Finally, at the world-system level, the G-7, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization will also have to be willing to tolerate varying degrees of neomercantilist policies by West African states, as such policies have been the most common way that relative losers have become winners in the global politicaleconomy, as in the cases of the Dutch and the English early on, the United States during the high-tariff nineteenth century, and the Asian tigers since the 1950s. Of course, neomercantilism in West Africa will not work unless its leaders seek longterm national development rather than short-term personal enrichment from such policies.
Because poverty is one of the root causes of West African coups and conflict, Japan, the United States, and the European Union can help the region by removing their tariffs and farm subsidies that throttle African agricultural exports. 51 The realities on the ground in the rich countries today show how far we are from this scenario.
Until the political economy of West Africa changes for the better, coups and conflicts can only be expected to continue, albeit in an unpredictable fashion. West Africans must take the lead in changing for the better their "praetorian societies," 52 and Cape Verde, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal suggest that this can be done. Unfortunately, it is not sufficiently recognized, particularly among Western governments and media, that the G-7's management of the world-economy has done little to help West Africans help themselves. 53 While West Africa's downward spiral is primarily caused by its peripheral political economies and the selfish behavior of many of its leaders-both civilian and military-the failure to reform global trade in agricultural commodities, primarily a failure by the world-system's G-7 core powers, is the major indirect cause of the region's discontents because it condemns West Africa to a continued trajectory of poverty, peripherality, and political instability.
Notes

